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1. Introduction 
This volume attests that the topic of gratitude has been gaining considerable academic ground 
recently. It has been the subject of lively debate in philosophical and psychological circles and 
enthusiasm for the topic shows no sign of waning. However, while there has been an appetite for 
interdisciplinary dialogue about gratitude within academia, there has been relatively scant 
examination of lay understandings of gratitude. Thus, whilst we have witnessed debate from 
eminent philosophers and psychologists as to how gratitude should be defined and understood, we 
have seen comparatively little assessment of laypeople’s conceptions of gratitude and how lay 
understandings ultimately compare with those of ‘experts’, be they psychologists or philosophers. 
The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues’ ‘Attitude for Gratitude’ research project sought to 
remedy this lacuna by canvassing the views of laypeople across a range of demographic variables, in 
a series of inter-related studies. We have examined whether features laypeople associate with 
gratitude resonate with terms used in definitions offered by philosophers and psychologists, and if 
the conditions on gratitude stipulated by these experts have traction in the real world. For example, 
do laypeople believe gratitude to be entirely positive? Do they think gratitude necessarily involves a 
benefactor going above and beyond the call of duty? Does gratitude rely on benign intentions or 
might it be experienced ‘accidentally’, ‘fortuitously’ or when an ulterior motive- or even malicious 
intention- lay behind another’s actions?  
Psychologists’ operational definitions influence the measures they create. We think it is important to 
examine whether the terms used in gratitude measures actually reflect lay understanding, for if they 
do not they cannot be said to offer truly valid assessments with real-world traction. To begin to 
elucidate this question, we conducted a prototype analysis of gratitude in the UK (Morgan, Gulliford 
& Kristjánsson, 2014) which we review below. Far from being perceived as an unambiguously 
positive concept, our UK sample associated gratitude with both positive and negative features. 
Furthermore, we found little support for the view that gratitude is characterised by awe or wonder, 
as some have suggested (Emmons & Shelton, 2002).  
We are concerned that measures of gratitude which include items about its purported features may 
‘construct’ gratitude in a way that is at odds with the experience of most people. Respondents may 
indicate a degree of assent to an item about, say, wonder, which they may have never hitherto 
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considered a feature of gratitude. Scores on this putative ’dimension’ may thus turn out to be an 
artefact of the researcher’s a priori thinking, rather than genuinely representing what most people 
understand by gratitude. We argue that empirical research into what laypeople understand by 
gratitude is an important first step towards circumscribing the concept. If ‘experts’, (philosophers or 
psychologists) want to stipulate certain features, dimensions or conceptual conditions of gratitude 
that do not emerge in lay understanding,  we believe they must give a plausible account of why they 
diverge from the majority lay view (see Section 5). 
In relation to conditions in which gratitude is experienced, we first undertook a review of the 
philosophical and psychological literatures on the topic (see Gulliford, Morgan & Kristjánsson, 2013). 
This revealed numerous conceptual controversies within and across ‘expert’ interdisciplinary 
borders. For instance, some philosophers (and some psychologists) either explicitly held (e.g. 
Roberts, 2004) or implied (e.g., Emmons, 2004) that gratitude necessarily involves going above and 
beyond duty1, while others believed gratitude was not subject to this supererogation condition (e.g., 
McConnell, 1993). Debate centred on whether gratitude necessarily involves a benefactor (e.g. 
Roberts, 2004) or whether a person could be grateful for some benefit without attributing this to a 
particular agent. 
Having uncovered a number of these conceptual controversies (see Gulliford et al., 2013) we 
developed two methods to examine how gratitude is understood by laypeople and what factors 
influence when, and to what degree, gratitude is experienced. With a specially designed vignette 
questionnaire, we manipulated conceptual controversies we had identified to see what factors 
laypeople believed would most impact their experience of gratitude. We assessed children’s 
understanding of these factors by examining their responses in a gratitude story workbook we 
designed. Whilst the stories did not map the conceptual controversies rehearsed in the vignettes 
exactly, we were able to make some informed cross-generational comparisons which could be 
compared with the opinions of ‘experts’- the ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’ of philosophers, 
and theories about attributions of gratitude in psychology (e.g. Wood et al. 2008).  
We are committed to the position that the thinking of the ‘Wise’ (academic experts) should be 
complemented with that of the ‘Many’ (laypeople), to represent the concept of gratitude as 
accurately and comprehensively as possible. We hope this chapter will illustrate why gratitude 
requires elucidation from both these camps, and demonstrates that a lay conception of gratitude is 
crucial to avoid a limited or ‘theoretically superimposed’ understanding of the concept.  
                                                            
1 ‘At the cornerstone of gratitude is the notion of undeserved merit. The grateful person recognizes that she did nothing to 
deserve the gift or benefit’ (Emmons, 2004, p. 5) 
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We proceed by demonstrating how we have shed light on the understudied topic of lay 
understandings of gratitude with our prototype analysis (Section 2); vignette questionnaire (Section 
3) and gratitude stories (Section 4). The stories were written with the goal of tapping children’s 
understanding of factors influencing gratitude, however they might also fulfil an educational role in 
enabling children to reflect on when gratitude is appropriate (see Morgan, Gulliford and Carr, 2015). 
In Section 5 we rehearse potential objections to our methods and to the viability of the conclusions 
we draw from them. We close by inviting other researchers to share our approach; one which takes 
conceptual analysis out of the armchair into the increasingly popular world of empirically informed 
philosophy (Buckwalter, 2010; Knobe and Prinz, 2008). 
 
2. Examining Features and Characteristics Laypeople Associate with the Concept of Gratitude 
in a Prototype Analysis 
Prototype analysis is a method of conceptual enquiry which can be used to shed light on the features 
and characteristics laypeople associate with a concept and which of those features are deemed most 
important or central to that concept. It has been used to elucidate, for example, the nature of 
emotion (Fehr and Russell, 1984), love (Fehr and Russell, 1991), and forgiveness (Kearns and 
Fincham, 2004). We conducted a prototype analysis of gratitude with a UK sample (Morgan et al., 
2014) which we compared with the findings of Lambert, Graham and Fincham’s (2009) prototype 
analysis of gratitude in the USA. We summarise our method and findings below. 
In the first stage of a prototype analysis participants write down features (actions, feelings, 
determinants, consequences) they believe are typical of the concept under consideration. They 
assign a valence (positive/negative) to each feature identified using a Likert scale. This enables 
researchers to examine whether the concept is perceived as largely positive, negative or neutral.  
108 students from the University of Birmingham (UK) participated in Study 1, noting down features 
and characteristics they believed exemplify gratitude, along with their associated valence score (1= 
very negative to 5 = very positive). 63 key features emerged with a mean valance of 4.29 (SD= 0.70). 
However, a number of features (obligation, indebtedness, embarrassed and awkward) were rated as 
negative in valence. Furthermore, some negative features were uniquely associated with gratitude in 
the UK (e.g. guilt, embarrassed/awkward). Interestingly, none of our UK participants or Lambert et 
al.’s (2009) US participants, referred to ‘wonder’ as a feature of gratitude, despite Emmons and 
Shelton’s (2002) depiction of gratitude encompassing  ‘a felt sense of wonder’. This is ‘a clear case 
where definitions of gratitude do not map onto the layperson’s conceptions’ (Morgan et al. 2014, p. 
11). 
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The second step of a prototype analysis examines which key features are deemed most central to 
the concept under consideration. Different participants rate the key features on a Likert scale, 
enabling a ‘nucleus’ of central concept features to be established around which relatively peripheral 
concept features can be identified.  
97 University of Birmingham students rated the 63 key gratitude features from Study 1 (1 = not at all 
central to 8 = extremely central). Results showed that there was a significant positive correlation 
between most frequently named features in Study 1 and their assigned centrality in Study 2 (r= .43, 
p <.001), and that more central gratitude features tended to be more positive in valence (r = .59, p 
<.001). However, the correlation between positive valence and centrality was weaker than Lambert 
et al. (2009) found in the USA (r = .84, p < .001). This finding, along with the incidence of unique 
negative gratitude features in the UK, suggests gratitude may not be perceived to be as positive a 
concept in the UK as it is in the USA.2 This may also speak to ‘expert’ understandings of gratitude 
which, in psychology particularly, have largely characterised gratitude as a positive emotion or trait.  
Centrality ratings were combined with frequency ratings (Study 1) to create a combined rank which 
was used to corroborate the prototypical structure of gratitude in Study 3.  To demonstrate that a 
concept has a prototypical structure it must be shown that feature centrality influences cognition 
involving the concept (e.g. recall memory, recognition memory, reaction time). In a third study (50 
students), we showed that fictitious characters demonstrating more central features of gratitude 
(assessed with the combined rank) were deemed more grateful than those demonstrating 
peripheral, marginal or remote features, thereby corroborating gratitude’s prototypical structure. As 
the findings of Study 3 are less salient for present purposes, interested parties should consult 
Morgan et al. (2014). 
Prototype analysis offers a way into examining lay understanding of concepts, which in some 
respects may differ from ‘expert’ understandings. While philosophers may distinguish between 
concepts to refine or reclaim what they regard as their ‘true’ meaning, it might be argued that they 
should hold no privileged place when it comes to defining the terms of language as it is actually used 
(see Gulliford, 2015 in press). We suggest that the conceptual understanding of gratitude be 
enriched by empirical research which canvasses the opinions of the ‘Many’ as well as the ‘Wise’.  
                                                            
2 For comparison purposes both studies were conducted with university students. To examine whether these findings 
extend to the general population, the study would need to be replicated with larger samples representing different 
demographic groups in the USA and UK.  
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To that end we now move to a further study, which examined how laypeople conceptualise 
gratitude by identifying what conditions (if any) laypeople place on when gratitude is- and should be- 
experienced.  
 
3. Examining Laypeople’s Understanding of Gratitude with a Vignette Questionnaire 
The goal of our vignette questionnaire was to see whether the conditions on gratitude stipulated by 
philosophers and psychologists (Gulliford et al., 2013) have traction in the real world. We sought to 
examine empirically the following conceptual controversies surrounding gratitude: 
• Cost (or risk) to the benefactor: To experience gratitude must the benefaction be costly to the 
benefactor (i.e., take a lot of effort/risk to bestow)? 
• Value of the benefit: Must the benefit always be of value to the recipient in order for them to 
be grateful? 
• Duty/Supererogation: Must gratitude involve someone going above and beyond the call of duty 
(be more than should be expected by them fulfilling the requirements of their job)? 
• Non-realised benefit: Does the benefit have to materialise for gratitude to be experienced, or 
can you be grateful for the thought/intention? 
• Ulterior motive: Must gratitude always involve benevolent intentions or can you feel grateful 
when there is an ulterior motive? 
• Malicious Intention:  Similarly, can you feel grateful when there were malicious intentions? 
• Mixed emotions: Can you still feel gratitude when other (negative) feelings are involved such as 
guilt and indebtedness? 
To explore these issues, we created four scenarios. Two scenarios involved high levels of gratitude (a 
rescue from a lake and a rescue from a fire). Two scenarios involved lower levels of gratitude (a 
nomination for an award and being a beneficiary in a will). Each scenario followed the same 
structure; they started with a baseline condition which was systematically manipulated to assess the 
various conceptual controversies. For instance, in Scenario 2 (nomination) the baseline condition 
reads: ‘A colleague nominates you for an award at work. If you win, you will receive recognition of 
your hard work and a voucher’. To assess whether individuals can be grateful in the presence of an 
ulterior motive, participants are subsequently presented with: ‘A colleague nominates you for an 
award at work. If you win, you will receive recognition of your hard work and a voucher. The 
colleague has nominated you because she wants you to repay the favour by helping her with her own 
workload’.  
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For each condition (baseline, ulterior motive, non-realised benefit, etc.), respondents are asked 
three separate questions: (a) whether they would be grateful if that situation were to arise, (b) how 
grateful they would be (i.e., degree of gratitude), and (c) whether they should be grateful (see Figure 
1). 
Figure 1. Example from Scenario 2 (nomination for an award); the conceptual controversy being 
tested here is the presence of an ulterior motive: 
A colleague nominates you for an award at work. If you win, you will receive recognition of your hard 
work and a voucher. The colleague has nominated you because she wants you to repay the favour by 
helping her with her own workload.  
  
(a) You are grateful to the colleague who nominated you. 
 
Strongly disagree           Disagree             Neither agree nor disagree    Agree     Strongly agree 
  
(b) Please indicate the degree of gratitude you feel on the scale below: 
 
  
  
 
  
 
(c) You should be grateful to the colleague who nominated you. 
  
Strongly disagree           Disagree             Neither agree nor disagree    Agree     Strongly agree 
 
 
To ensure the questionnaire was a manageable length, only two scenarios were tested at a time. The 
order and type of scenario presented was counterbalanced across participants. Adults accessed the 
questionnaires online while adolescents in full time education completed them in hard copy.  
 
Participants: 
510 adults across the UK participated: 74% were female; 80% were White-British; mean age 28 
years.  
271 Secondary school pupils from Cheshire (England) participated: 54% were female; 95% White-
British; mean age 14 years. 
 
Analysis:  
Data from the two high gratitude scenarios (1 and 3), and the two low gratitude scenarios (2 and 4) 
were combined. Scores for the ARE, DEGREE and SHOULD questions for each condition were 
Not at all  
grateful 
Most grateful 
you could feel 
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calculated and entered into a repeated analysis of variance (rANOVA). The rANOVA examined 
differential responding from the baseline condition in the high and low gratitude scenarios enabling 
us to see, for example, whether the presence of an ulterior motive decreases gratitude experience in 
comparison to the baseline condition.  
Findings: 
Cost (or effort/ risk) to the benefactor: In the low gratitude scenarios, the mean scores for ARE, 
DEGREE and SHOULD questions3 all increased significantly in relation to the baseline where 
benefactors expended greater effort in bestowing a benefit. The mean score at baseline ARE was 
4.30 (SD = 0.79) in comparison with a mean cost ARE score of 4.57 (SD = 0.67). The mean baseline 
DEGREE was 73.25% (SD = 18.33), compared with a mean cost DEGREE rating of 80.34% (SD = 16.68). 
Finally, the mean baseline SHOULD was 4.40 (SD = 0.68), whereas the mean cost SHOULD score was 
4.50 (SD = 0.71). Therefore, cost or effort appears to be an amplifier of gratitude experience. 
Conversely, however, in the high gratitude scenarios there was no perceived increase in ARE, 
DEGREE or SHOULD scores with higher costs to the benefactor. This is due to extremely high 
gratitude scores at baseline (M = 4.89; SD = 0.44) with almost no room for an increase (see Graph 1). 
We speculate that when the benefit is as enormous as saving one’s life then as long as the benefit is 
realised the specifics of the rescue are immaterial. 
Duty/Supererogation:  There is strong evidence that laypeople (at least in our sample) believe 
gratitude is warranted to individuals who are simply fulfilling the requirements of their job; only 
1.4% disagreed/strongly disagreed that they would be grateful to the lifeguard or firefighter because 
it is their job to help.  
Value of the benefit: We examined whether an unwanted award or non-valuable legacy would 
influence the level of reported gratitude. The value of the benefit was tested in Scenarios 2 and 4 (as 
you could not profess that saving a life is non-valuable). Interestingly, the mean responses to all 
three measures (ARE, DEGREE and SHOULD) significantly decreased in comparison to the baseline. 
The mean baseline DEGREE was 73.25% (SD = 18.33), compared with a mean non-valuable DEGREE 
rating of 49.73% (SD = 24.08)4.  This suggests that it is not always the thought that counts. A mixed 
ANOVA comparing adults and adolescents also revealed that adults reported significantly lower 
levels of gratitude for an unwanted benefit than adolescents (p < .01). 
                                                            
3 In the following descriptions, ARE scores refer to mean responses to the ‘you are grateful’ Likert questions; DEGREE 
scores refer to mean responses to ‘how grateful would you be’ slider questions; and SHOULD scores refer to mean 
responses to ‘you should be grateful’ Likert questions. 
4 The mean score at baseline ARE was 4.30; SD = 0.79 in comparison with a mean non-valuable ARE score of 3.29; SD = 
1.02. Lastly the mean baseline SHOULD was 4.40; SD = 0.68, whereas the mean non-valuable SHOULD score was 3.80; SD = 
0.83 
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Non-realised benefit:  When examining the effect of an attempted benefaction that did not 
materialise reported gratitude decreased in all three measures in comparison to baseline. The mean 
baseline DEGREE was 73.25% (SD = 18.33), compared with a mean non-realised DEGREE rating of 
66.83% (SD = 20.64)5. Again this indicates that the proverb ‘it’s the thought that counts’ may not 
always ring true. 
Ulterior motive: When an ulterior motive is present in an apparent benefaction (e.g. the colleague 
wanting help with her workload), we see significant decrements in gratitude experience (Baseline 
DEGREE = 73.25%; SD = 18.33; Ulterior Motive DEGREE = 37.53%, SD = 24.0). Surprisingly, however, 
over one fifth of the respondents reported that they would still feel grateful regardless of the 
ulterior motive (see Graph 2). 
Malicious intention: Similarly, the presence of a malicious motive also undermines reported 
gratitude (Malicious DEGREE = 27.12%; SD = 23.98). Yet again, however, a malicious intention does 
not necessarily disqualify gratitude as over 12% of our sample stated that they would be grateful 
even when the benefit was given with the intention of embarrassing or harming them. 
Mixed emotions: Within the low gratitude scenarios we also examined whether negative feelings 
such as guilt and indebtedness could coincide with gratitude. Interestingly, when asked to imagine 
feeling either guilty or indebted a large proportion of respondents still reported that they would be 
grateful 58.1% agreed and 21.9% strongly agreed that they would be grateful despite feelings of 
indebtedness or guilt. However, the level of reported gratitude in this situation did decrease 
significantly in comparison to baseline. The mean baseline DEGREE was 73.25% (SD = 18.33), 
compared with a mean mixed DEGREE rating of 67.13% (SD = 19.07)6.A mixed-design ANOVA 
demonstrated that adults were significantly (p < .01) more likely than adolescents to acknowledge 
the co-occurrence of gratitude with mixed emotions (i.e., guilt and indebtedness). 
  
                                                            
5 The mean baseline ARE score was 4.30; SD = 0.79 in comparison with a mean non-realised ARE score of 4.07; SD = 0.82. 
The mean baseline SHOULD score was 4.40; SD = 0.68, whereas the mean non-realised SHOULD score was 4.18; SD = 0.82. 
6 The mean score at baseline ARE was 4.30; SD = 0.79 in comparison with a mean mixed ARE score of 3.95; SD = 0.80. The 
mean baseline SHOULD was 4.40; SD = 0.68, whereas the mean mixed SHOULD score was 4.13; SD = 0.75. 
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Graph 1:  Mean ARE and SHOULD Likert scores in each condition of the high gratitude scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2:  Mean ARE and SHOULD Likert scores in each condition of the low gratitude scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When comparing lay British public with expert views on gratitude we see considerable agreement. 
For example, cost or effort on the part of the benefactor appears to enhance gratitude experience, 
whilst the presence of non-benevolent intentions and non-valuable or non-realised benefits seems 
to undermine gratitude experience. This supports the idea that whilst a benefit is not required to be 
costly, valuable or well-intended, these factors act as amplifiers of gratitude experience 
10 
 
(McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons & Larson, 2001; Tesser, Gatewood & Driver, 1968; Wood et al., 
2008).  
Our data does suggest, however, that supererogation is not a necessary condition of gratitude, as 
posited by Roberts (2004). The majority of participants reported that they would feel grateful 
towards someone who was simply doing their job. An interesting development of this scenario, 
however, would be to examine whether gratitude to those doing their job extended to more 
mundane circumstances such as being grateful to a bus driver or waiter; perhaps the magnitude of 
the benefit in life-saving scenarios influenced respondents’ decisions.  
One possibly surprisingly finding here concerns the proportion of respondents who were grateful 
regardless of non-benevolent intentions. Over 20% reported that they would be grateful when an 
ulterior motive was implicated, and over 12% stated that they would be grateful even if malicious 
intentions were involved. This suggests that experiences of gratitude may extend to situations which 
do not involve benevolent intentions. 
The findings from this questionnaire also indicate that gratitude can coincide with negative feelings 
such as guilt and indebtedness. In scenarios where guilt and indebtedness were intimated, a large 
percentage (80 %) reported that they would be grateful despite feelings of guilt or indebtedness. 
However, the degree of gratitude experienced decreased relative to the baseline. This co-occurrence 
of gratitude and negative feelings, in this vignette questionnaire and the prototype analysis, 
challenges the view that gratitude is entirely positive.  It suggests gratitude may have a shadow side 
that we believe should be recognised more openly. In a recent paper, Morgan et al. (2015) we argue 
that ignoring negative associations of gratitude could have potentially dangerous effects and that 
gratitude, like other ‘positive’ emotions, can be both ‘sweet-and-sour’ (Colombetti, 2005, p .117). 
 
4. Accessing Children’s Understanding of Gratitude with Stories 
To explore children’s understanding of gratitude (aged 8-11 years) we developed four gratitude 
stories. Over these four stories we examined the same conceptual controversies highlighted in the 
vignette questionnaire. For example, in one story, ‘St Oscar’s Oscars’, a student nominates  a 
classmate for an award at school only to reveal that her motive behind this benefaction was to copy 
the nominee’s answers in a spelling test. In ‘The Class Councillor’, a shy boy called Jason is 
nominated class councillor with the aim of embarrassing him in front of his peers. (Importantly, 
however, Jason rose to the occasion and even won the votes of the antagonists).  
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As far as possible, these four stories mapped onto events in the vignette questionnaire: ‘The Blue 
Oasis’ follows a rescue from a waterpark which is akin to Scenario 1; ‘The Class Councillor’ and ‘St 
Oscar’s Oscars’ follow themes outlined in Scenarios 2 and 4 of the questionnaire; and ‘Shooting 
Hoops’ explores issues of duty.  
In order to collect data, the stories were interjected with questions probing students’ thoughts on 
whether the characters in the stories would feel grateful. The questions included Yes/No responses, 
Likert items on the level of gratitude experienced, and open-ended questions. Within a one-hour 
lesson, teachers read one of the four stories with their students, pausing at set junctures to answer 
questions. 
Participants: 
269 primary school pupils (aged 8 – 11 years) completed one of the story workbooks. Six schools 
across the UK participated, 90 students were from the West Midlands; 33 from Derbyshire and 146 
from Scotland. 80.3% were White-British, 51% were female.  
 
 
Findings: 
Cost (or risk) to the benefactor and Non-realised benefit:  ‘The Blue Oasis’, like Scenario 1 of the 
questionnaire, explored whether a higher level of gratitude is deemed fitting towards a passer-by 
who attempts at great risk to themselves (but fails) to save a struggling swimmer, or towards a 
lifeguard who succeeds in saving the swimmer. 65% of the primary school sample believed they 
would be more grateful to the man who tried but failed to save them. Children appeared to calibrate 
gratitude in terms of cost/risk as opposed to the realisation of the benefit. When asked why, 27% of 
students’ qualitative responses referenced ‘risk’.  
 
Interestingly, adults appeared to take a less favourable view of risk-taking behaviour. In comparison 
to adolescents, adults were significantly (p < .001) more likely to disagree that they would be 
grateful to a passer-by (in comparison to a lifeguard or firefighter) because ‘there is a bigger risk 
involved’ (34.6% and 11.2% respectively). Therefore, perhaps adults view risk-taking behaviours as 
foolhardy rather than virtuous (see Arthur et al., 2015).  
Duty/Supererogation: ‘Shooting Hoops’ explored duty by describing an eventful game of basketball 
where the characters’ sense of duty to retrieve a wayward ball was continually altered. When Dinesh 
accidentally sent Liam’s ball over the fence, 93% believed that Liam would be grateful to Dinesh for 
retrieving the ball (even though it was Dinesh’s duty to retrieve it). However, when Jade retrieved 
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the ball after Liam sent it flying (supererogation) 97.5% reported that Liam would be grateful. Whilst 
gratitude does not necessarily entail going above and beyond the call of duty, supererogatory acts 
may enhance gratitude experience.  
 
Value of the benefit: In ‘The Blue Oasis’, the birthday boy, Ben, is gifted a non-valuable benefit- a 
lame supermarket Donald Duck birthday cake (when he expected a home-baked rocket cake). When 
asked whether Ben would be grateful for the cake, 79 % agreed. However, this situation is not 
directly comparable to the vignette scenario as there is still some value in the cake. This was 
highlighted by the participants themselves, some of whom pointed out that ‘a cake is still a cake’. In 
the open-ended responses, 44% referenced the fact that Ben still got a cake or that a cake is 
nonetheless nice. 12% mentioned the fact that Ben received the cake in addition to other presents, 
implying that they thought gratitude was appropriate. 
  
Ulterior motive: 29% believed that a character (Robbie) would be grateful for a nomination for an 
achievement award even though it was done with the ulterior motive of (Lois) copying Robbie’s 
spelling test. Interestingly, when examining the qualitative responses it was apparent that only 70% 
of respondents actually understood that an ulterior motive was present.  
 
Malicious intention: In terms of malicious motives, 86% of respondents believed that Jason would 
not be grateful for his nomination to be class councillor when malicious intentions drove the 
‘benefaction’. 
  
Mixed emotions: To explore the effect of mixed emotions, ‘St Oscar’s Oscars’ includes a 
circumstance where Ethan receives a nomination for an achievement award from Jordan. Ethan now 
feels obliged to nominate Jordan in return; however, he really wants to nominate another classmate, 
Dominic. Following this feeling of obligation, 37% of the sample believed that Ethan would not be 
grateful for the nomination and 3% explicitly amended the workbooks to answer Yes and No. Open-
ended responses revealed that 40% of children believed Ethan would experience confusion and 13% 
mentioned a sense of awkwardness. Interestingly, 21% of the sample reported that Ethan should 
now nominate Jordan in return. 
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In summary, our data revealed that almost all adults, adolescents and children believed that 
gratitude was not subject to a supererogation condition.7 The data demonstrated some interesting 
generational differences; younger respondents appeared to take a more positive view of a have-a-go 
hero who helped at greater risk than their older counterparts did. The vignette data also revealed 
that adults were significantly less grateful to receive a benefit that was not of any real value to them 
(e.g. a nomination for an unwanted award) than adolescents (p < .01). This indicates that younger 
people may be more likely to appreciate the thought behind an intended benefit. Adults were 
significantly more likely than adolescents (p < .01) to acknowledge that mixed emotions (guilt or 
indebtedness) co-occur with gratitude (see Arthur et al., 2015). 
 
As we have explained, the stories were written with the principal goal of tapping children’s 
understanding of gratitude; the vignettes would not have been suitable for primary school children. 
However, in addition to fulfilling this explicit aim, we recommend these stories as educational 
resources for teaching young people about when gratitude is – and is perhaps not- appropriate (see 
Morgan, et al. 2015 in press). Our analysis revealed that almost a third of children did not appear to 
understand when ulterior motives were involved in an apparent benefaction. Furthermore, around 
20% thought feelings of indebtedness obligated a character in the story to nominate a different 
person than they had previously intended. Given these findings, we propose that the workbooks 
could be used as a means of teaching young people complexities surrounding the appropriate 
‘grammar’ of the virtue of gratitude.    
 
 
5. Objections to our Empirical Approach 
As we have shown, it is our contention that empirical data on laypeople’s understanding of gratitude 
can be used to illuminate conceptual points. For example, our data show that a large sample of 
laypeople -across a range of ages- do not deem gratitude to be subject to a supererogation 
condition. Philosophers- or psychologists who either explicitly -or implicitly- take the view that 
gratitude necessarily involves a benefactor going above and beyond the call of duty can thus be 
presented with data at odds with their a priori theorizing. We suggest that the intuitions of these 
theorists be challenged and refined on the basis of empirical observations, such as ours, so that a 
                                                            
7 98% adults and 95% adolescents agreed/strongly agreed that they would be grateful to a lifeguard/firefighter rescuing 
them in the line of duty. Similarly, 99% of 8-11 year olds agreed with the statement that a character in a story ‘should be 
grateful to the lifeguard for getting her out of difficulties even though it is her job to do that.’ 
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‘reflective equilibrium’ may be reached between ‘conceptual- normative’ and ‘empirical-factual’ 
work on gratitude.  
The approach we advocate may be disquieting for many philosophers, who may take the view that 
presenting empirical data to illuminate conceptual points represents a category mistake. Critics of 
the empirical approach proposed here may argue that philosophers, equipped with rigorous training 
in abstract thought and logic are best suited to undertake conceptual analysis. Roberts, while 
acknowledging that his conceptual work on the nature of gratitude and its status as a virtue has 
undergone refinement and correction through his interaction with the present authors (2015, p. 4), 
also makes a forthright appeal for the merits of philosophical theorizing; ‘Philosophers are equipped 
by their historical knowledge and above all by their training in dialectics (argument, rebuttal, 
comparison, and conceptual analysis) to answer normative questions. As valuable as it may be to 
know what the British think about gratitude, no amount of such information will settle questions 
about what gratitude really is, the value of gratitude, or the particular conditions for gratitude’s 
counting as a human excellence.’ (2015, p. 4). 
The present authors believe there is a place for both what Roberts calls ‘conceptual- normative’ 
work and ‘empirical-factual’ work on gratitude. Consequently, we do not claim that all conceptual 
theorising about gratitude ultimately stands or falls on the basis of empirical data, which, it must be 
recognised, derive from particular population samples which cannot be generalised absolutely. This 
is an epistemological point: it simply would not be possible to canvass all lay understandings of 
gratitude in any study, and – as such- the empirical method could never be said to have the ‘final 
word’. Nonetheless, the impossibility of that task should not preclude the possibility of undertaking 
any empirical research in an attempt to illuminate these matters from a lay perspective. 
To put this point in more concrete terms, we do not take the view that if, for the sake of argument, 
85% of a large and diverse sample of laypeople believe that X is a condition of the proper 
applicability of (virtue) concept C, then philosophers should take this as the last word on the nature 
of C. We do believe, however, that this should be the first word, and that if philosophers want to 
insist that X is not a conceptual condition of C, it becomes incumbent on them to explain why the 
majority of a sample representative of the general public, are wrong. Truth- famously- is not 
democratic, so the proper meaning of concepts should not be decided on purely numerical grounds. 
On the other hand, however, philosophers should have no monopoly on the way language is used by 
ordinary people, as we have argued elsewhere (see Gulliford et al., 2013; Morgan & Gulliford, 2015). 
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6. Conclusions 
Our approach resonates to some degree with a recent movement in philosophy that emphasises the 
importance of canvassing lay conceptual understandings, and of basing definitions on observation 
and experiment, rather than purely a priori theorizing. The field called ‘experimental philosophy’, 
has recently risen to prominence, championed by the likes of Joshua Knobe (Knobe, 2004; Knobe, 
2007; Knobe & Prinz, 2008; Knobe & Nichols, 2008) and Shaun Nichols (Nicols, 2004; Nichols & 
Knobe, 2007) who have applied an empirical approach to the philosophical topics of consciousness, 
determinism and intentional action, for example.  
We maintain that our approach of canvassing lay understanding of the topic of gratitude- what we 
have referred to as the views of ‘the Many’, complements rather than supplants, the views of ‘the 
Wise’. We have suggested elsewhere that philosophers pay attention to the work undertaken in this 
domain as ‘a good conceptual analysis needs to respect ordinary language as much as possible’ 
(Gulliford, Morgan & Kristjansson, 2013, p. 35). Moreover, an empirical approach can weigh in on 
questions about the putative characteristics of gratitude and the conditions in which it is 
experienced.  
 
For instance, we found that to some extent it isn’t just the thought that counts; non-realised   and 
non-valuable benefits significantly decreased reported gratitude. Furthermore, our research showed 
that gratitude was not disqualified by malicious or ulterior motives on the part of a benefactor. It will 
be recalled that a fifth of respondents reported they would be grateful when an ulterior motive was 
present, while over 12% indicated that they would be grateful even where malicious intentions were 
at play. These findings clearly go against the received view that gratitude requires benevolent 
intentions. Data from the prototype analysis and the vignette questionnaire also challenge the 
perception, familiar to psychology, but also common in the philosophical literature, that gratitude is 
unambiguously positive in valence.  
 
On the basis of these and other insights, we wholeheartedly support the merits of an empirical 
approach. While some devotees of the armchair may offer their objections to the contamination of 
lofty theorising with what they may perceive as misguided empirical quarrying, we believe the 
approach has much to offer a conceptual understanding of gratitude, and we advocate similarly 
interdisciplinary examinations of other virtues alongside gratitude in the future.   
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